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RECENT DECISIONS
enforceable with respect to things done and rights accrued up to the
time that fulfillment of the object of the contract became impossible.14
A.J.
CORPORATIONS-OFFICERS-APPEAL AND ERROR-CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw.-The Securities Exchange Commission brings certiorari
to review a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia,' reversing an order made by the Commission
approving a plan of reorganization for the Federal Water Service
Corporation. The directors and officers of the Federal Water Ser-
vice Corporation (hereafter called Federal), a holding company reg-
istered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935,2 pur-
chased preferred stock of the company during a period in which the
management of the company, which they controlled, proposed to the
Commission successive plans of reorganization pursuant to the Act.3
The respondents controlled Federal through their control of its par-
ent, Utility Operators Company, which owned all of the outstanding
shares of Federal's Class B common stock, representing the control-
ling voting power in the company. Prior to this plan, three other
plans for reorganization were submitted by Federal which provided
for participation by Class B stockholders in the equity oi the proposed
reorganized company. This feature of the plans was unacceptable
to the Commission, and all were ultimately withdrawn. The present
plan proposing a merger contemplated the elimination of Class B stock
and the conversion of the preferred stocks and Class A stock into a
new common stock with a par value, the effect of which was to reduce
materially the capital of the corporation. The Commission declined
to approve the plan on the ground that the plan permitted the pre-
ferred stock purchased by respondents to participate in the reorgan-
ization on a parity with all other preferred stock. Thereafter, the
plan was amended to provide that the preferred stock, so purchased,
unlike other preferred stock, would not be converted into stock of the
reorganized company, but might be surrendered to the reorganized
24 Economy v. S. B. & L. Bldg. Corp., 138 Misc. 296, 245 N. Y. Supp. 352
(1930); Alfred Marks Realty Co. v. Hotel Hermitage Co., 170 App. Div. 484,
156 N. Y. Supp. 179 (1915), cited supra note 5.
1128 F. (2d) 303, 75 U. S. 374 (App. D. C. 1942), wherein order of
Commission was reversed and remanded on the ground that the Commission
acted on a vital question of policy which Congress would have to act first by
changing the standard it has expressed in the Act. Thus, the Commission ex-
ceeded its statutory authority. There was at the time no regulation of the
Commission, no provision of the Statute, and no rule of common law or equity
prohibiting the purchase of stock by an officer or director of a corporation
during the pendency of reorganization proceedings.
2 C. 687, 49 STAT. 803, 15 U. S. C. A. § 79 et seq.
3 PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING ComPANY ACT OF 1935, §§ 7 and 11.
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company at cost plus 4 per cent interest. All of the purchases were
currently reported to the Commission as required by the Act.4 Over
the objections of the directors and officers involved, the Commission
approved the plan as amended. The Commission conceded that the
respondents did not acquire their stock through any favoring circum-
stances. The question is whether the Court of Appeals erred in re-
versing the Commission's order based upon the Commission's finding
that it would be detrimental to the interests of investors and unfair
and inequitable within the meaning of the Act to allow the preferred
stock so purchased to participate in the reorganization on a parity
with all other preferred stock. Held, there is no "established legal
principle" which makes an officer or director accountable to his cor-
poration for any profit which he may realize by investing in his com-
pany's securities pending reorganization, and also, -if the Commission
should believe that this is a practice which should be forbidden, it can
forbid it by rule which would presumably be prospective and not
retroactive in its application or by order. Judgment reversed. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation et al., 317
U. S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 454, 87 L. ed. 411 (1943).
Although the holding in the Supreme Court technically reverses
the lower court opinion, for all practical purposes it affirms it.5 The
majority opinion is far from clear as to just what finding the Com-
mission would have to make to sustain its order without passing a
general rule. The finding may be one of a particular wrongdoing or
injury in a particular case, or merely a finding that the Commission,
in its experience, is of the opinion that the application of a rigid rule
is necessary to prevent possible abuses.6 Under Delaware law the
purchase of shares of stock in a corporation by a director is entirely
legal and proper,7 and such purchases of preferred stock together with
dividends in arrears thereon, might be converted into new securities
through a merger.8 A dominant or controlling stockholder is a fidu-
ciary.9 Corporate directors are fiduciaries.1 0 The rule sustained by
the weight of authority is that the officer or director does not occupy
a fiduciary relation to the stockholder with respect to his shares of
stock in the corporation and that in buying and selling stock an officer
or director may trade like an outsider provided he acts in good faith
and does not intentionally conceal facts." While they are not trus-
4Id. §17.
5 128 F. (2d) 303, 75 U. S. 374 (App. D. C. 1942).6 See Note, Chenery Corporation v. S.E.C. (1942) 56 HiRv. L. REv. 126,
on the power of the S.E.C. to limit directors' purchases of stock.
7 Cahall v. Lofland, 12 Del. Ch. 299, 114 At. 224 (1921); Dupont v.
Dupont, 256 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. 3d, 1919), certiorari denied, 250 U. S. 642, 39
Sup. Ct. 492, 63 L. ed. 1185 (1919).
8 N-avender v. Federal United Corp., 11 A. (2d) 331 (1940).
9 Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919).10 Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U. S. 587 (1875).
11 Dupont v. Dupont, 242 Fed. 98 (D. C. Del. 1917), also cited supra note 7;
Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419, 29 Sup. Ct. 521, 53 L. ed. 853 (1909).
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tees in the technical sense of the term, they occupy a fiduciary relation
to stockholders respecting corporate transactions, 12 and a relation of
trust to the corporation by being bound to exercise the strictest good.
faith in respect to its property and business.1 3 The Act 14 denies to
directors and officers the right to profit from short term dealings in
the securities of their corporation by requiring the filing of statements
of their security holdings in the company and further provides that
profits made from dealings in such securities within any period of less
than six months shall inure to the company. "The cases 15 upon
which the Commission relied do not establish principles of law and
equity which in themselves are sufficient to sustain its order," and I
believe it will be difficult for them to enforce a penalty by way of
limitation to cost upon the findings of a past transaction which has
been harmful to the public interest or the interest of investors. Both
subordination and the limitation to cost cases are cases 16 based on the
fiduciary relationship, and in each of the cases the claimant was a
stockholder. The leading subordination case is known as the Deep
Rock case. 17  There the parent claimant in a reorganization proceed-
ing was to receive stock in the new company. The court held that
the parent's mismanagement, resulting in the subsidiary's insolvency,
required the subordination of the parent's claim to that of preferred
stockholders. This present decision eliminates any possibility of the
court connecting the Deep Rock doctrine with a limitation to cost
theory. The limitation to cost is a somewhat less drastic penalty than
subordination for a similar type of situation.
M. M. D.
CRI INAL LAW-DOUBLE JEoPADY.-Defendant-appellant was
convicted of violating a federal statute (12 U. S. C. A. § 588b) by
entering a national bank in Vermont with intent to utter a forged
'Heim v. Jones, 14 F. (2d) 29 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926).
'3 Elliot v. Baker, 194 Mass. 518, 80 N. E. 450 (1907).
14 PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT OF 1935, § 17 (a and b).
'15 Magruder v. Drury, 235 U. S. 106, 35 Sup. Ct. 77, 59 L. ed. 151 (1914);
Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, 11 L. ed. 1076 (U. S. 1845). The Commission
applied an analogy to the latter case which dealt with specific obligations of
express trustees and in which case the following rule of equity is noted-"that
a purchase by a trustee or agent of the particular property of which he has the
sale, or in which he represents another, whether he has an interest in it or not
-per interpositam personam--carries fraud on the face of it" The Commis-
sion held here that even though the management does not hold the stock of the
corporation in trust for the stockholders, nevertheless the duty of fair dealing
which the management owes to the stockholders is violated if those in control
of the corporation purchase its stock, even at a fair price, openly and without
fraud.
16 Pepper v. Litton, 100 F. (2d) 830 (C. C. A. 4th), certiorari granted, 307
U. S. 620 (1939).
17 See Note, The "Deep Rock" Doctrine: A Realistic Approach t Parent-
Subsidiary Law (1942) 42 CoL. L. REv. 1124.
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